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Center Discu ssion Papers are prelim inary mater ials circul ated
to
stimu late discus sion and critic al comment. Refere nces in public
ations
to Discu ssion Papers should be cleare d with the author to protec
t the
tentat ive charac ter of these papers .
This paper was presen ted at the New York Unive rsity Confer ence
on
'Econo mic Issues of Multin ationa l Firms' and will be publis hed
in
a procee dings volume .

Inter natio nal Mark ets for Exhau stible Resou rces,
Less Developed Coun tries, and Trans natio nal Corpo ration s
Carlo s F. lliaz Aleja ndro*
Yale Unive rsity

Both economic theor y and histo ry teach that the topic _of
inter 
natio nal marke ts for exhau stible resou rces is a diffi cult
and troub led one.
This essay will surve y the relev ant litera ture, elabo rating
on the diffi culti es and the troub les. Posit ive analy sis will lead us
to predi ct more of
the saTile in the futur e. But perha ps a bette r under stand
ing of the issue s
could lead to modes t norm ative sugge stions regar ding ways
of impro ving the
worki ngs of such marke ts.
.

'

· Trade in exhau stible mine rals, even when carri ed out by
natio nals
of the same cmmt ry, is diffe rent than trade in co:rn or
sc1°ews. The first
inevi tably invol ves inter- temp oral calcu lation s, v,lliJ.e the
J.atte r do not.
When such trade is carri ed out _inte rnatio nally , furth er
comp licati ons arise .
The world is such that miner al depos its are typic ally not
evenl y sprea d
a.inong count ries, nor of even quali ty, thus gener ating Ricar
dian rents .
Unce rtaint y often surro unds the futur e of techn ical chang
e in produ cts
using miner als as input s, as well as the techn ology used
in mines . Dis
cover y of new mines has often been dr2-T:J.atic :md disco ntinu
ous. Prope rty
title s to the new mines can be blurr y. The explo itatio n
of mines or
depo sits, as well as the distr ibutb n avd proce ~sing of
their outpu t,
usual ly rE,qu ires large masse s of capita J. rela.t i ve to other
input s and a
tight organ izatio n. The develo pmen t of new mines or de:;-)o
sits usual ly
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take a good deal of planning time.

Exhaustible resources seem like special

gifts from the gods, in the sense that they appear to be at·a given time
unique substances very difficult to substitute in consumption or production.
And yet their uniqueness can be wiped out overnight by technical change.
Where markets are so plagued with both uncertainty and the need for
large capital commitments, it is not surprising to find large organizations
which try to control and regulate trade and investment in exhaustible
resources.

And as many governments have perceived that such resources are

vital to "national security," it follows that those large organizations,
even when theoretically private, have had especial links with home and
host countries.
Little wonder, then, that throughout history trade in minerals has
been associated with a violence and conflict surprising even to a melancholy
mid-ocean auctioneer.

The regions now under the sovereignty of less developed

cotmtries ( LDCs) have held and still hold a good share of the world's store of
economically valuable exhaustible resources; it could be argued that remaining
deposits and ore bodies in LDCs are of higher grade than those in industrialized
countries, as the latter have been worked and prospected more intensively.
But from the days of the Spanish search for American gold, at least, through
those of Belgian mines in the Congo, the people inhabiting those regions have
had reason to wonder about the net benefits to them of such endowments, and
of international trade in their outputs.
The first half of the paper will survey analytical points arising from
several branches of economics, such as capital theory, international trade and
industrial organization.

It will also deal, somewhat amateurishly, with bits

of history and politics.

The second half will review policy proposals ranging
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from grand designs for a new world order for trade and investment in
exhaustible resources, to more modest suggestions in areas such as taxation
and contracts.

At the end of the paper the reader will be reminded of some

of the areas neglected in this survey essay.
The Pure Economics of Exhaustible Resources
A positive side-effect of OPEC's success has been a rebirth of interest
in the pure economics of natural resources.

Some of the best brains in the

profession have flocked to analyse issues largely dormant since the days of
Hotelling's classic article. 1 While the area has become a playground of
high-powered theorists, the basic economic results of their work provide
insights into the less formal issues of interest to us.
A fixed and known stock of an exhaustible resource in the ground may
be regarded as a capital asset, among other assets which a given owner, or a
country may have.

The representative owner will have to decide whether to

e:>..1)1.oit the resource, or to leave it w1derground.

If the marginal costs of

exploitation and the present and future prices of the resource are known to
the owner, assumed to be a price taker, the decisiort for him will be straight
forward.

Stock equilibrium for resource owners will be realized when they

expect the price of the resource, net of costs, to increase at a rate equal
to that or" the ruling interest rate.

Only under these conditio~s will the

resources in the ground, assun1ed to be homogeneous, yield a rate of return to
their owners equal to those of other assets.

Efficiency calls for all forms

of investment having the same yields; in other words, Venezuela should "sow
petroleum" into new factories and schools only while the rate of return of
those produced assets is higher than the appreciation of oil in her ground.
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If the equil ibrium condi tion does not hold, owner s will
be dissa tisfie d with
the struc ture of their portf olios , and will wish to have
more or less asset s
in the groun d.

•

Under these assum ption s, the equil ibrium time profi le for
the net
price will have an upward tilt. Consumers of the resou rce
will pay the net
price plus extra ction unit costs . When curre nt consu mptio
n is small
relat ive to total stock s of the resou rce, the net price
(pure .rent ) compon~nt
in the final price will be small . In that case, the econo
mics of that good
appro aches that of renew able resou rces. Salt, limes tone,
and other miner als
used in cement produ ction may be given as examp les. But
for many exhau st.ible
resou rces it can be expec ted that event ually the •scar city
rent will begin to
domin ate the movement in the marke t price . The trans ition
, in fact, may be
·abru pt, and expec tation s regar ding futur e price s may be
revis ed dis
conti nuous ly.
Notic e that full equil ibrium requi res not only the portf
olio
condi tions discu ssed &bove, but also a balan ce in the flows
demanded and
suppl ied for each time perio d, at the equil ibrium price .
The flow marke t
which has to clear is not just one marke t, but the seque
nce of marke ts for
the resou rce from now until the date of exhau stion.
Those who glibl y take for grant ed the effic iency of exist
ing world
marke ts for exhau stible resou rces may wish to consi der Rober
t Solow 's
evalu ation of how likel y the effic ient equil ibrium descr
ibed above is likel y
to be obser ved in p~act ice:
"But there clear ly is not a full set of futur es marke ts;
natur al-res ource marke ts work with a comb inatio n of ieyopi
c
flow trans actio ns and rathe r more farslg hted asset trans
-

actions.

It is legitimate to ask whether observed resource

prices are to be interpreted as approximations to equilibrium
prices, or whether the equilibrium is so unstable that
momentary prices.are not only a bad indicator of equilibrium
relationships, but also a bad guide to resource allocation.
That turns out not to be an easy question to answer.

Flow

considerations and stock considerations work in opposite
dire~tions.

The flow markets qy themselves could easily be

unstable; but the asset markets provide a corrective force. 112
A whole set of additional difficulties hides behind previous
references to interest rates, rates of return, and such, which were presumed
.to be equal, and given, and "right."

In short, no difference was postulated

between private and social rates of discount.

Yet .what may be a sensible

discount rate for Anaconda or Exxon need not be the correct rate which
shoti~ld be used, say, by Chilean or United States government officials
planning social policy.· The former should take into account such things as
taxes on capital returns, expropriation risks, etc., while the latter should
not usually consider them.

Some would go further, denying.that private

time preferences should form the bases for intertemporal decisions, and
that the utilities of future generations should be given the sam0 weight
as those of present generations.

At any rate, the choice of a rate of social

time preference is crucial, involving a decision about intergenerational
distribution.

To quote Robert M. Solow again:
"The pure theory of exhaustible resources is trying to

tell us that, if exhaustible resources really matter, then
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the balance between present and future is more delicate
than we are accustomed to think; and then the choice of a
discount rate can be pretty important and one ought not to
be too casual about it. 113
The Hotelling microeconomic model clearly makes a large number of
simplifying assumptions, which explains why historical experience does not
easily fit with its predictions (e.g., relative copper prices are lower today
than 100 years ago). 4 Resources labeled exhaustible may better be referred
to as nonrenewable.

Nevertheless, the simplest natural resource models

already highlight that even if we limit the analysis to competitive markets
withiR one country, to homogeneous deposits and little uncertainty, doubts
arise regarding the stability and efficiency in those markets.

Yet more

complexities lie ahead.
The Internetional Dimension
Within a country, some regions will have an excess supply of
minerals and fuels (e.g., Montana and Texas), while others will have an
excess demand for them (e.g., New England).

Both types of regions will,

however, live under laws, customs and habits which are not too dissimilar,
so that depletion allowances, taxes, discount rates, and subsoil property
rights are roughly common.

Rules for the settlement of disputes, anti-

. trust laws, etc., will be comparable.

Within the United States, contracts

made in one state must be honored in others, while trade restrictions
between states are prohibited.

Under these circumstances, markets have a

reasonable chance to perform their functions, even if subject to the
difficulties discussed earlier.

In spite of this, the clash of divergent
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regiona l economic interes ts regardin g natural resourc es will find and echo,
and often more than that, in the politica l arena of Congres s or Parliam ent,
. and the Texas Railroad Commission will conside r necessa ry the sending of "a
message to Washington" by ordering oil product ion cutback s. 5
Compared with most nationa l markets, which are buttress ed by lavrn
and.esta blished customs , interna tional markets are a jungle.

For auction 6

or spot markets this may be relative ly unimpor tant, but for markets involvin g
long horizons the trouble is more serious.

And it was seen in the previou s

section that the theory of exhaust ible resource s underlin es the importan ce
of the long view.
Suppose one has countrie s with high discoun t rates and countrie s with
low discoun t rates.

Now assume that some countrie s are net users of

exhaust ible resource s and others are net produce rs.

If the number of ·both

types of countrie s were large, and the resource s were more or less evenly
spr~atl amcng all countr,. es, perhaps interna tional ms.rkets could be orJffnise d
so that every net consUII1ing country can get what it wants from a willing net
produce r country, without any discussi on of freedom of access to supplies nor
politic al pressure s.
But now suppose there is only a handful of net produce rs, and that
they happen to be firm believe rs in conserv ation, having a very low discoun t
rate, perhaps for religiou s reasons .

Net consume rs of that exhaust ible

resourc e will be tempted to politici ze this interna tional market, and will
philoso phise regardin g the right of a handful of countrie s to control world
supplie s.

(The net produce rs, in turn, will philosop hise on the right of

a handful of countrie s to account for high shares of world consump tion.)
The point wrrn put forcefu lly, and in a rather extreme form, by R. G. H.1.wtrey
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as far back as 1930:
"Mankind has become dependent on the systematic use of
the material resources of the world, and cannot afford to
allow those resources to be withheld from use through the
shortcomings of communities which rule over them.

This

applies not only to primitive communities, but to any
sovereign authorities which obstruct development."

"The positive guiding principle should be not justice
but expediency, and expediency here means aiming at the
maximum of material welfare, without restriction to any
particular section, group or nation. 117
The legitimacy of ownership of natural resources has other troubling
dimensions.

Within countries, laws may regard the subsoil as common

property of the whole nation, not subject to private ovmerslii.p.

'J.'ru. .s can

lead to the est~blishment of national monopolies for the exploitation of
natural resources, whose presence in international trade and investment
creates fresh difficulties for those hoping to estab,lish clear rules of
the game for international markets.

It can also lead to the granting of

very long term leases, whose original terms are made obsolete b:r changing
circwnstru1ces.

One may also note that in the United States, federal law

restricts foreign participation in U.S. enterprises associated with the
development of federally-owned mineral resources.
A good share of the earth, such as the oceans and the Poles, has no
clear property titles, and its nonrenewable resources are open for

9

exploita tion to all capable of doing so.

This free access generate s

technol ogical externa l disecono mies and gross economic ineffici encies.

It

also sets the stage for dangerou s politic al friction s among overlapp ing
claiman ts.
Further Annoying Complic ations of the Real World
Of all factors of product ion, exhaust ible natural resource s are
among the least evenly spread among nations , the least homogeneous and the
least mobile.

Trade theoris ts familia r with Labor and Capital find this

messy third input tricky to handle but difficu lt to ignore, particu larly
after Leontie ff!s paradox .· All natural resourc es .may be lumped togehte r into
an ill-defi ned Ricardia n "atmosp here," influenc ing labor product ivity while
shatteri ng the assumpt ion of identic al product ion function s.

Linear

homogen eity in Labor and Capital , of course, has to be revised .
theoris ts may be called for help .

Locatio n

.And so on.

But trade theoris ts like those headach es.

Perhaps more relevan t to

our preoccu pations are the enormous costs involved in obtainin g informa tion
about new deposit s of resourc es, matched by the huge rewards awaiting those
who find them.

Throughout history , the hope of a fabulous bonanza has been

a powerfu lly motivat ing force going far beyond narrow economic behavio r.
The hope for a bonanza , togethe r wlth the hope for a major inventio n, trigger
efforts qualita tively differen t from those of the represe ntative entrepre neur
who shaves costs in ~he struggle for a normal rate of return.
The search for both new deposits and inventio ns has become
increas ingly systema tized; large organiz ations with massive explora tion or
research budgets have on the whole replaced the maveric k invento r or
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prospector.

Yet it remains difficult to pin down the chances of substantive

technological breakthroughs or the discovery of important n.ew mineral sources
to a clearly defined probability distribution.

Historically, at least, the

search for new deposits does not appear to have been a matter of obtaining a
bit more information by spending a little more.

The information break between

before and after discovery has often bee:h sharp, a matter which, as will be
seen below, also sets up cycles of bargaining strength between searchers and
owners of resources.
Discovery of large new deposits may not much influence total world
output of that commodity, particularly in the short run, but it is likely to
have a dramatic impact on its price, if open market exist for it, or on the
plans of the organizations involved in the trade of that resource, if such
organizations have replaced open markets.

Output of existing mines will

dominate observed quantities, while breakthroughs in information will be
registered more in open market prices and/or investment plans.
The fact that often a handful of deposits are far superior to others
(the Potos{ silver mines, the Saudi Arabian oil pool, the South African gold
mines, etc.) is to some observers a more important characteristic in ex
plaining the economic history of mineral trade than the exhaustible nature of
those commodities.

Advantage of one deposit over others can arise from

location rather than mineral quality.

The Ricardian model of uifferential

rents, originally applied to an ever renewable resource (land), would be
more relevant than a Hotelling model with exhaustible homogeneous deposits.
Differential rents for minerals, of course, could be exptected to be larger
than for land, but otherwise (so the argument goes) little would be lost by
dropping the exhaustible characteristic of the resources.
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As noted earlier, when current consumption is small relative to
total stocks of an exhaustible resource, its final price will only have a
small component of what may be called Hotelling rent.

It could, nevertheless,

for deposits of high quality or choice location, include a high share of
~icardian rent.

The average mix of rents will be different for different

exhaustible natural resources; the analyst should take both of them into
account.
Besides the uncertainty about reserves, the related uncertainty
regarding future technologies will hamper the smooth operation of markets.
The uncertainty can,be, first of all, about techniques for searching for new
deposits.

New technologies can also appear for working known mines,

influencing unit costs.

Industries using resources as inputs can change

their unit input requirements thanks to technical change, or change? in
tastes or the introduction of new final goods (e.g., the automobile) ~ay
dras-ti,:.:Jlly change the structure of the d.erbred demand for resource inputs.
Technical change can generate cheap substitutes for resource inputs
previously regarded as critical; witness the history of Chilean nitrates
and Peruvian guano.
Economic life, of course, is full of all types of uncertainty.

The

argument is that in the field of exhaustible natural resources such uncertainty seems to be especially great.

Economic acti viJc,fos also require

capital and certain minimum scale of operations to make sense.

Both the

search for new deposits and their e?CJ)loitation appear to be, once again,
especially capital intensive, where capital includes both physical and
human capital, as well as social overhead capital.
located in remote places.)

(Many mines are

Such ccipital intensity plus organization
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requirements in production, transportation and marketing combine to generate
indivisibilities in the production and distribution of many exhaustible
natural resources.

As a result, for substantial output ranges marginal

costs are considerably below average costs, even if the former are rising.
Viewed in a more Austrian fashion, new mining projects also have long
gestation periods, and many things can happen between the time it is decided
to go ahead with the development of a new mine, and the time output actually
begins to flow out of it.
Some observers claim that both the capital and time intensity of new
projects, as well as their lumpiness, have become even more marked in recent
years.

This could be due partly to a more intensive working of the Ricardian

·margin, which also raises intra-marginal rents, but.also to the realization
that a resource previously regarded as free, i.e., clean environment, is
after all yet another exhaustible natural resource.

Although exhaustible

and not subject to rising private marginal costs, cle~:i.1 environment has
shared with'ocean resources the feature

·or

non-appropriability; in the

absence of clear social rules there has been a tendency to use it inefficiently
and excessively.

But the new social rules to avoid using up clean environment

too fast in the process of, say, mining copper, involve larger expenditures of
capital.

These rules could vary from country to country, either because of

different social tastes for clean environment, ·or because of different
endowments of clean environment in the various countries.

It is perhaps

unnecessary to elaborate on how different national rules on environment
protection, as well as on how imperfections in capital markets, could
increase the difficulties for open and, competitive international markets
for exhaustible resources which require ever-increasing and lumpy doses of
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capita l for their social ly accept able exploi tation.
Before turning to the examin ation of how real world nation s and
institu tions have handled these textboo k nightm ares, a furthe r compli cation,
which perhap s should have been placed first in the list, may be added.
Whethe r rightly or wrongl y, many societi es have regarde d some exhaus tible
natura l resourc es as "critic al," "essen tial" or "vital" to their welfar
e.
Advanced indust rial econom ies, for exampl e, have so regarde d oil. ·Nation
s
whose econom ies are heavily depend ent on the produc tion of one or.two of
those resourc es have, for differe nt reason s, simila r fixatio ns.

It is a fair

guess that market s are unlike ly to operate in textboo kish fashion for
conuno dities regarde d as "lifebl ood" and such.
Enter Trans- Nation al Corpor ations (TNCs)
A Martia n reader of Arrow and Solow could expect that the com

plexit ies discuss ed so far would be handled by an intrica te networ k of
future s, insuran ce, and conting ency market s, and would rush to The Wall
Street Journa l to deligh t in how November 1982 copper quotat ions would
mesh
with insuran ce rates agains t the conting ency of earthqu akes in Chilean
mines.
But he would be lucky to find a handfu l of futures quotat ions, and for
fairly close dates at that, for exhaus tible resourc es (he would find more
future s' quotati ons for other raw materi als).

He may get some Lints from

stock market quotati ons for shares of compan ies owning minera l deposi ts.
But the number of these are few, and declini ng.
Wby the lack of futures prices?

The immedi ate answer is that a

domina nt share of intern ationa l (and nation al) commerce in exhaus tible
natura l resourc es is carried out within large vertic ally integra ted firms,
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which substitute corporate planning for open competitive markets, either of
the auction type or those involving long-term but arm's length contracts.
Part of the explanation for such a substitution has to do with the relatively
poor performance of open markets in the presence of the uncertainti~s and
compl~ities discussed earlier.

For commodities with high fixed and low

variable costs, and where information is imperfect, badly diffused or
asymmetrically located, it is reasonable to expect a nonmarket institution to
~

replace the market.

kid

incentives for vertical integration becom~ large

when uncertainty regarding the supply price of the upstream good pressures
the informational needs of downstream firms. 8 Conditions in t4e trade of
oil, bauxite, nickel, and copper appear to meet amply these requirements
for the emergence of nonmarket institutions.

Notice that once these

institutions have become going concerns they in turn undermine the possibility
of open markets.

Even if circumstances change, and auction markets or long

term contracts at arm's length become feasible alternatives, the previous
existence of TNCs will hamper their emergence.

Once they have come into

existence, TNCs will routinely erect and protect barriers to entry,
including hoarding mineral deposits, limiting technological diffusion and
establishing exclusive marketing networks.
The above does not rule out the existence of oligopolistic rivalry
among TNCs engaged in international trade and investment, nor entry of new
actors into the oligopolistic game.

Patterns of rivalry and cooperation

have changed over the years and have varied among resources; in copper and
oil, for example, the pre-world-war-t wo degree of world market control by
a handful of firms has been eroded during the postwar, while the diamond
cartel appears as strong vs ever and the nickel oligopoly remains robust.
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The standard scenario includes a few established firms (the "majors")
controlling most known deposits and with a strong interest in preserving
oligopolistic stability, for which purpose they raise barriers to entry.
Lean and hungry potential entrants (the "independents") are their natural
enemies.

If the latter obtain access to rich new deposits, as Occidental

did with Libian oil during the 1960s, the majors can get into trouble ..
New entrants into the exploitation of a given nonrenewable natural
resource are often firms long established in another.

The creation of totally

new firms appears most likely in new types of activities, as with mining the
seabed.

The propensity of established natural resource firms to diversify

and form consortia

seems to be on the rise, partly to diversify risks and

maintain oligopolistic order, and partly to deter host countries from
obtaining competitive bids from independent firms or to raise the costs to
those countries of potential disagreements with foreign firms.

Anti-trust

leglslation in some industrialized countries checks somewhat this tendency
toward collusion, but mainly insofar as it damages their own consumers.
Collusion of national firms when dealing with foreigners, in fact, is often
encouraged by that legislation.
Is this all there is to it?

Why, in particular, have until

recently most TNCs engaged in the commerce of exhaustible natural resources
come from a handful of countries?

It could be argued that nationals of

those countries, which historically have been dominant both economically
and pol~tically, have a comparative advantage in dealing with the un
certainty and informational requirements of the commerce in exhaustible
resources, or indeed in all international activities characterized by such
requirements.

This may be so, but only if such "comparative advantage" is
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broadly defined to include contacts with their home governments, and the
symbiotic relationship which historically has characterized the dealings of
TNcs·with the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, in
particular.
The argument is neither that home governments are simply the tools
of TNCs, nor that TNCs are the submissive instruments of hegemonic powers,
but to stress that in an area p~agued with uncertainty, and where information
is highly prized, the pressures toward considerable interaction between TNCs
and home governments have historically been very great.

This mutually

supportive relationship has been clearest perhaps in the case of oil,
especially in the years around the First World WaT, and the decade and a
half following the outbreak of the Second World War.

"Quite simply, parent

governments have generally been willing to leave the industry's running to
more-or-less private companies, but, being aware of the strategic importance

of oil.from the 1910s at least, have been willing to step in to support them
whenever necessary • . .

Occasionally •when a major ran afoul of a producing

government, the'parental authorities have provided diplomatic support, though
this has generally been in an overt form, and has not always been marked by
total enthusiasm (particularly in later years). 119
It could be argued that the politician's concern with stable, secure
and cheap access for his country to exhaustible natural resources has been
tinged with irrationality throughout history, from the Pharaohs to Tojo.
Markets, after all,_ could have done the job, and without being dominated or
replaced by TNCs.
paper.

We shall explore this possibility toward the end of this

But it is well to remember that not so long ago raw materials were

regarded as the 1)ases of military power, the causes of war, and occasion
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for economic struggle.

The Atlantic Charter gave prominent place to access

to raw materials ; earlier Herbert Hoover had given great weight to his fight
as Secretary of Commerce against what he regarded as European carteliza tion of
some raw materials .
stated:

More recently, a sophistic ated observer has flatly

"From an American perspecti ve, military intervent ion might be most

readily occasione d by our fears of resource scarcity. 1110
The case of Japan, after its defeat in World War II, is of particula r
interest when consideri ng what is sometimes referred as the three basic
types of security:

military, food and energy.

Japanese officials continue to

worry that the growth of their country will be increasin gly constrain ed by
lack of available supplies of natural resource imports, and about the
vulnerab ility of an economy so dependent on imported energy and natural
resources .

Such considera tions heavily influence Japanese foreign policy:

in the delicate balancing of links with China, which may become an important
oil exporter, and the U.S.S.R., whose Siberia offers an even more attractiv e
source of potential supplies; in foreign aid programs, frankly designed to
please exporters of raw materials and their friends; and in the allocatio n of
direct foreign investmen t, which increasin gly goes into processin g industrie s
. resource ric
. h count ries.
.
11 Although now lacking
in
in substanti al military

power of its own, it is not surprisin g that Japanese officials prefer to
handle their resource diplomacy to a large extent via Japanese fi1;Js, rather
than foreign-ov med TNCs.

Japanese firms have accomodat ed themselve s· more

readily to new modalitie s for obtaining natural resources , such as joint
ventures with host country organizat ions and long term contracts , than have
the classic TNCs from the nations victoriou s during World War II.
The Japanese are remarkabl y candid regarding their resource
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diplomacy, and the linkages between their aid, trade and direct foreign
investment policies, on one hand, and their anxiety to secure access to
LDC fuels and mineral resources, on the other.

But much the same thing is

likely to go on in France, Germany and other industrialized countries.
It would be difficult to argue that the manner in which international
trade and production of exhaustible natural resources has been carrie.d out
over, say, the last one hundred years, was solely dependent on purely tech
nological and economic data, independently of the political realities
within and among countries.

As those political realities change, even if no

changes occur in other data, the actors involved in the production and trade
of resources will·also be modified, and their pattern of interaction will be
different from the past.

National rivalries present a barrier to TNCs in

their efforts to control and internalize markets; for example, the Italian
state oil corporation pioneered in the destruction of the hegemony of the
"seven sisters."

Under other circumstances.- governmental actions can en

courage the dominance of a handful of firms, ·as noted for pre-world-war-t wo
oil, and as may be happening with U.S. firms for undersea mining.

And

political decisions are thrusting forward names such as BRASPETRO (the
Brazilian oil state company) and CODELCO (the Chilean copper state company)
onto the financial pages of the world.
Enter the LIX:s
How does one explain the secular upward trend in Venezuela's share
of oil revenues obtained from her soil, or the rise in the C:W.lean or Zambian
shares in copper revenues?

Has such a rise been at the expense of excess

profits of TNCs exploiting the resource, or at the expense of consumers of
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the resource, or simply the workings of the invisible hand?
A first hypothesis could be that as both Hotelling and Ricardian
rents have increased through time, they have naturally accrued to the owners
of the scarce resources, i.e., the LDCs.

LDC shares sixty years ago were

low, so the argwnent would run, simply because pure rents at that time
were negligible, competitive prices being made up almost wholly by real costs,
including a normal rate of return to capital.

This story does not ring

true; bits of evidence indicate that profits in many mining ventures and in
oil were above the normal level, although it is far from clear whether the
super-profits came from the appropriation by TNCs of Hotelling or Ricardian
rents, or from their oligopolistic prices, or perhaps from unusual efficiency.
Kennecott, for example, has been reported to have been making 20%-40% per
year on its investment in El Teniente, in Chile, during the late 1929s. 12
"Increase in bargaining power" is the magic phrase which appears to
answer best the first question raised in this section.

But exactly 1.,ha.t

factors account for the rise in such power is a more debatable issue.

To

bargain effectively, the LDCs needed first of all sovereignty, a matter not
obtained until after the second world war in many parts of the third world.
Secondly, their policy makers needed a minimum of freedom from physical
coercion, represented by foreign gunboats and such.

Diffusion of world

mili tar:r power, and competition among the handful of super-powers, provided
the necessary (even if limited) room for manouver.

Thirdly, and related to

the prev~ous point, the expansion during the last 30 years in the number of
foreign firms of different nationalities which are buyers of raw materials
and suppliers of capital and technology increased LDC options.

Fourthly, LDC

policy makers required the will to get a bigger share, and not just for

'
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themselv es persona lly.

Domestic politica l pressur es in this directio n

increase d as third world populat ions gained in politic al awarene ss.

And last

but not least, the creation of local expertis e and knowledge regardin g the
relevan t industry , its custome rs and competi tors, made credible the threat
of having the host country run the mines and deposit s by themsel ves.

This

process still has far to go; it is striking how few Chilean s know the
intricac ies of world marketin g in copper, how few Venezue lans are familia r
with the Middle East oil industry , etc.
But the third world, and countrie s such as Austral ia and Canada,
have come a long way sfnce the days when La'zaro C~rdena s nationa lized
Mexican oil in 1937, while the not too unsympa thetic Franklin D. Rooseve lt
was Presiden t of the United States.

In retrosp ect, the amount of potenti al

LDC revenues lost by lack of bargain ing power are likely to be very large.
I have elsewhe re suggeste d the followin g mental experim ent:

what would have

been the LDC stare in the rents p1:oduced by their na-t-Jral resouw~ es ( say in

1900, or 1920, or 1950) had those countrie s granted permiss ion to exploit
those natural resourc es only on the basis of competi tive bidding , open to
buyers from all over the world?

The differen ce between the revenue s

obtained and those which could have been obtained is likely to be substan tial,
and may be blamed basical ly on the use of politic al and oligops onistic power
by the major users of natural resourc es.

Yet, also in retrosp ect, it could be argued that the charact eristics
of mineral industr ies made the rise of LDC bargain ing power almost inevita ble.
The concent ration of mines or deposit s, in contras t with the diffusio n in the
product ion of most tropica l crops, made taxable surplus highly visible even
to a "soft state," and, eventua lly, also quite vulnera ble to the exchequ er.
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Fed by revenues from mines, LDC governments could expand and improve their
expertise.

There has always been the danger that a sudden expansion of

national revenues could lead to a rentier mentality with disastrous
long term developmental consequences; this is the fear of thoughtful
Venezuelans who compare the situation in their country today with that of
sixteenth-century Spain.

But in spite of extravagance, under contemporary

circumstances, a good share of tax revenues will find its way to developmental
expenditures which will further reinforce the nation's ability to bargain,
while creating habits and expectations which place a floor on national claims
on mineral activities.

Those habits and expectations do limit the willingness

of the host country to display bargaining power by shutting down mining

operations, yet visible, concentrated and vulnerable installations provide a
continuous temptation to do so if the LDC feels sufficiently aggrieved.
Net resources subject to negotiation between TNCs and LDCs may be
of two kinds:

the Hotelling or Ricardian pure rents which would arise even

under conditions of perfect competition, and the excess profits generated by
departures from perfect competition in the sale of the resources.

Until

recently, one took for granted that LDCs were gradually increasing their
share of pure rents, a process which need not affect prices paid by
consumers.

Since 1973 there have been a growing number of analysts

suggesting that LDCs vlill bargain also for an increasing share of what may
be called oligopolistic excess profits, and that they will also try to
increase.the level of such profits, naturally at the expense of consumers.
In the struggle over pure rents, LDCs would match wits with TNCs, while
consumers remain more or less indifferent spectators.

The lure of

oligopolistic excess profits would mute the LDC-TNC clash, as both would be
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allied against the consumer. 13
It should be noted that oligopo listic excess profits need not
be reflecte d in above average book rates of return for TNCs, even in the
absence of LDC pressure s.

Often such surplus is dissipat ed in buying

security of supplies or sales, or in buying politic al power, trru1qu ility
and comfort for the bureauc racies running the organiz ation.

Funds may be

spent casting dollar ballots for favorite politici ans, or in lavish
advertis ements showing how the company loves fish and fowl in the environm ent,
or simply padding payroll s.

The power and prestige attached to control ling

such "costs" will lure LDC bargain ers as much as declared excess profits .
The game has indeed become complic ated. ·But one somewhat paradox ical
trend should be stressed :

even as some observe rs in industr ialized countri es

warn of LDC "carteli zation" of resource markets , basing themselv es mainly on
the OPEC experien ce, 14 LDC actions have unleashe d in several of those markets
pressure s pushing toward greater competi tion.

The poi.nt is simply that the

number of indepen dent actors in those markets has increase d with the pro
liferati on of nationa l compani es in charge of at least the product ion of
mineral s.

The nationa l companies are not (as yet) as vertica lly integra ted

as the TNCs they replace .

This means, inter alia, that users of natural

resource s see expanded their range of choice, while past special relation 
ships between upstream and downstream firms become shaken.

This may he a

tempora ry phase in world markets , but while it lasts it creates an
opportu nity for open competi tive world markets in mineral s which did not
exist while those markets were interna lized by TNCs.

It is peculia r that

many worrying about LDC "carteli zation" of bauxite showed little concern
about how the bauxite and aluminum markets worked before LDC actions , and
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over the
say little about the long run effect s of, say, Jamaic an action s
degree of compe tition in aluminum produ cts.
A New Order in Intern ationa l Marke ts for
Exhau stible Natura l Resou rces?
Since 1973 a number of fresh and not-so -fresh propo sals have been
stible natur al
advanc ed for restru cturin g world trade and invest ment in exhau
for those
resour ces, rangin g from those design ed to stabil ize the prices
rces Bank
produ cts, to more ambiti ous ones, such as the Intern ationa l Resou
con
idea, presen ted by the U.S. Secret ary of State to a surpri sed UNCTAD
ferenc e at Nairob i in May 1976.

But before examin ing possib le scena rios

of the old
for the new order, it will be desira ble to examirte some featur es
which have been only hinted at in earlie r pages.
l
A centra l featur e of the old order was that for fuel and severa
miner als

TNCs, for all their oligop olistic rivalr ies, ran effect ive

nts of the
commodity sta1)i lizatio n scheme s, at least for subst antial segme
marke t.

During most of the post-s econd -world -war period , partic ularly during

l, molybdenwn
1953-1 971, world dollar prices for oil, iron ore, bauxi te, nicke
done by a
and magnesium were relati vely stable in nomin al terms. This was
within
combi nation of buffer stocks strate gicall y held at severa l places
produ ction
vertic ally integr ated TNCs, contro l over suppl ies with elasti c
be used to
respon ses, plus inform ation and marke ting netwo rks wbich could
custom ers,
alloca te or ration availa ble suppli es among differ ent types of
itself )
ranged from most p:Defe rred (often other depart ments of the TNC
to least prefer red.

In some produ cts, such as coppe r, part of the marke t

ed as
was under this kind of regime , while the remain der could be regard
Exchan ge,
closer to an "autio n marke t," center ing arcund the London Metal
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and operating under arms~length rules.

Even as some copper users enjoyed

especial "customer relations" with producers, guaranteeing stable prices
and a favored place in the queue for supplies, others faced considerable
price instability for their raw materials, probably aggravated by the
segmented nature of world copper markets.
Under the commodity stabilization regimes of the TNCs, investment
planning, including the search for new deposits and new technologies·,
relied more on a long view generated by their intelligence networks than on
the fluctuations of spot or future markets for minerals, as registered in
open markets.

This, of course, made a great deal of sense as, for example,

the fluctuations of copper prices in the London Metal Exchange (or of those
for zinc, lead, or tin) are likely to be inefficient predictors of the
situation in those markets five years hence.

The central intelligence of

TNCs, in short, can improve on segmented and marginal markets.

Compared

with.nineteenth century bonanza stor:i.es, they can also rationalize the
world-wide search for new deposits; indeed, this has to be an integral part
of their attempt to keep world markets orderly.
The TNC commodity stabilization regimes showed their clearest
features during war-time, when TNC-parent government cooperation naturally
became quit€ open, as parent governments would insist in their role as the
preferred customer.

Thus, during the Korean War, the TNC rationing

machinery, supervised by the U.S. government, was used to dampen price
increases in copper, to the unhappiness of copper-producing countries.
The rise in the bargaining power of the LDCs where mineral and fuel
deposits are located are threatening the commodity stabilization regimes
of the TNCs, and the hierarchies implicit in them for customers and

25

governments.

Already during the Vietnam War, for example, Chile extracted

concessional loans from the United States as a condition for going along
with arrangements which during the Korean War were simply imposed by the
United States.

As

noted earlier, the greater number of key actors in world

markets for exhaustible resources seems to promise greater competition and
more choices for actual and potential consumers, including as potential actors
and consumers the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, Asia and the
Caribbean.

But there is little to assure us that this new competition

will lead to reasonably efficient and stable world markets, nor to politically
acceptable ones.

It is not so much that many of the new actors are state

enterprises, whose actions are likely to be at least as politically motivated
as those of the classic TNCs.

Neither is it that WC pressures lead TNCs to

dampen their oligopolistic rivalries, promoting corporate consortia and
financial interpenetration within and across types of exhaustible natural
resources, although some of this seems to be occurring.

National rivalries

among industralized countries, at any rate, are likely to put a ceiling on
such a process of concentration.

The basic problem is that clear rules for

these world markets do not exist, on matters such as access to supplies,
access to national marketsr settlement of disputes, etc.

Where some sort

of authority is not present to impose "accountability conditions to guard
against conscious fraud or unintentional overcommitment by individual economic
agents" at a reasonable cost, one should expect that "trade in any but short
term and easily monitored and enforced contracts to be severely limited. 1115
Immediately after the Second World War, the Havana Charter for the
International Trade Organization (ITO) provided a useful first approach
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toward such a framework, including both rules for state enterprises and
what may be called Keynes-ITO commodity stabilization agreements.

By the

early 1950s hopes for United States ratification of the Havana Charter were
dead, while world trade in exhaustible natural resources was once again
dominated by central intelligence units, in the form of TNCs from a handful
of countries.

Institutions arising from war and postwar planning, in fact,

tended to support and consolidate such a regime;

recall how the Inter

national Bank for Reconstruction and Development would refuse lending to
state-owned LDC enterprises in oil on the grounds that private capital was
available for those a~tivities, naturally from TNCs.
So one possibility for the near future is that with the TNC commodity
stabilization regime in decadence, and no alternative regime in place,
world markets for exhaustible resources would become more competitive in
8ome sense, but also more unstable and unpredictable.

Under these circum--

stances, prices obse:".'ved in warkets will be poor g1.ri d.es for fresh investments.
Eventually the world market ·will once a.gain become fragmented, as users of raw
materials seeking predictability in prices and in the flow of supplies will
seek special "consumer relationships" with producers .... This could occur in
geographical patterns of the "spheres of influence" type.
An alternative scenario would feature the emergence of a modus

vivendi between LDC national enterprises, which could include paper
organizations, and the TNCs.

This collusion between LDCs and TNCs to

share in oligopoly·profits is what some observers see as a key feature of
16
The stability of
OPEC, and what some see as desirable in the copper case.
this new partnership will depend on other changes in world markets,
particularly those where management, technology and capital can be hired
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separately, as well as the will of LDCs to expand their capacity to combine
all of these inputs.

But it would give a new lease on life to TNCs engaged

in the trade of exhaustible natural resources.
It is the confused outlook for world trade and investment in
exhaustible natural resources which explains the inclusion of ten rather
terse paragraphs, proposing an International Resources Bank (IRB), in the
17
The "many advantages and new con
1976 Nairobi speech of Dr. Kissinger.
cepts" of this proposal, according to his proponent, are the following:
1)

The IRB would be a kind of "honest broker" between host c01mtries

and foreign investors, encouraging both equity and project development;
2)

Its· participation would reduce non-commercial risks, promoting

investment;
3)

Deals would feature production-sharing, apparently not unlike

the co-production schemes of socialist countries;

4) Projects could be financed by issuing bonds secured by a
specific commodity, and they could be retired by delivery of a specific
commodity.

The IRB could guarantee these financial instruments against non

commercial risks.

It is argued that the bonds would be a fruitful new

international instrument for forward purchases of commodities, while
providing added assurance for access to both markets and supplies;
5)

The IRB would encourage the progressive acquisition of

technology by the host country.
The IRB would not invest its own equity in projects, altho_ugh it
could act as an agent in selling bonds issued by the project entity.

The

primary function of the IRB will be to guarantee project investment finance
against non-commercial risk.

Regardless of host country equity participation
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in the project, the host government would have to participate in the
contract for the IRB to join the mining project.

It is not expected that

the IRB would become involved in further stages of processing such as milling
and fabricating.
Proponents of the IRB emphasize that ore bodies being worked in LDCs
are often much higher grade than those being developed in the industrialized
world.

Furthermore, the dorr~in of industrialized countries has been

prospected and explored much more intensively than that of the LDCs.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the IRB proposal is its
implicit criticism of past and actual arrangements for world trade and
investment in exhaustible natural resources (the proposal excludes
agriculture; it is concerned mainly with minerals, although it could also
play a role in the energy field.)

Its tone is very far from that of not-so

distant U.S. official statements regarding the wonders of laissez-faire in
international markets.

It admits gross imperfections in commodity, capit.81

and technology markets, and de facto recogniz·es the crisis in the postwar
TNC commodity stabilization regimes.

Coming from an official of a capital

exporting and raw material-impor ting country, the proposal naturally arouses
suspicions which would not surprise either readers of Kemp and Jones, who
know how capital inflows can lead to imrniserizing declines in host country
terms of trade, or readers of the history of pre-1914 British overseas
investments.

But the proposal opens fresh ways of looking at world markets

for resources, and candidly admits that wide differences exist between the
quality of mineral deposits in industrialized countries and in LDCs,
implicitly accepting LDC claims to at least Ricardian rents.

Indeed, it is

a somewhat backhanded tribute to those in the LDCs who have called for a New
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International Economic Order, without whose persistent claims proposals
such as that for the IRB would have never come to pass.
It is unlikely that a new world order for trade and investment will
spring full grown from anyone's brow, nor that anything as thorough as the
Havana Charter will be forthcoming in the near future.

The search for a new

order is likely to be a complicated process, made up of several st.rands.

We now turn. to examining some of these strands.
Contracts
In spot auction markets contracts between parites can be fairly
precise, but are usually superfluous, unless lags between agreement and
delivery are long.

In customer markets it is difficult to pin down the

substance of the relationship between the parties in a legal document,
particularly when the parties are from different f!ountries.

The legal-

econontlc history of contractual arrD.ngements between TNCs and L0C~;; les s.1...so

lawyers· from industrialized countries, proclaiming the importance of
''international law" against what is seen as LDC inability to respect contractual
obligatJons.

From recent years, incidentally, one can recall impassioned

defenses of the "rule of law" against alleged LDC encroachments on the rights
of TNCs from individuals later involved in leeal problems of tlJc,j_r o~m, having
to do w.tth the Watergate matter-, as v1elJ.

1li3

f:r:om TUCs :u:.::t.el' shewn -~:::: have

engaged themselves in rather peculiar practices.

In LDCs, sometimes weak

governments have not dared to release the full text of contracts with TNCs,
for fear of public opinion outbm sts.
0

A more annlytic2.l approac-h to the h:i.stor:r and realities of LDC-TNC

'

JO

contracts, however, has already begilll, in spite of the difficulty of having
access to the relevant documentation.
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This approach recognizes, first

of all, that in the past many concession agreements have contained provisions
which no sovereign government could realistically be expected to tolerate for
a substantial period, forming part of the sad history of \Ulequal treaties
imposed on LDCs by hegemonic powers.

Concessions in perpetuity or 99 years,

control by TNCs of vast land areas, etc., vrould be included in what now can be
regarded as unrealistic in most LDCs, even if they still can be found in some
industrialized countries.
The new approach also recognizes that concessions disputes between
LDCs and TNCs are inevitable.

They may arise from different interpretations

of complex provisions in a contract, or from changing circumstances which
make clear contractual provisions grossly unrealistic.

Even for the case of

OPEC-TNC dealings during the 1970s, which are often given as an example of
LDC inabil:ity to keep a;:;:::·eernents, Edith Penrose has noted:

11

I think the

evidence indicates that, although power had shifted, most of the governments
wanted in good faith to reach agreement with the companies; they made
concessions to do so and did not lightly abandon the agreements reached.
But the fall in the value of the United States dollar, in terms of which
prices had been set, combined with illlexpectedly high rates of international
inflation and unexpectedly rapid rises in the marl-mt prices of oil in 1972
and 1973~ created circumstances that undermined the basis of the agreements
by vitiating the expectations that were held by both companies and govern
ments at the time when they were made.

Renegotiation became essential if

the agreements were reasonably to serve the mutual interests of the parties. 1119
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As noted by Raymond Vernon in his pioneer ing work, there are
inexorab le cycles in the bargaini ng strength of TNCs and LDCs.

When a TNC

first goes into an LDC to look for a deposit , its bargain ing power will be
at a peak; unless the LDC governm ent is quite sure that there are deposit s
of reasona ble quality within its territor y, it will have little leverag e
even if there are many TNCs as potenti al investo rs.
point will be generou s.

Concess ions at this

Even when the TNC favored with a concess ion finds

a deposit, its bargaini ng power will remain high, as the proper technolo gy
as well as transpo rtation and marketin g arrangem ents may yet to be
establis hed.

Asymme trical access to informa tion as between TNC and the host

governm ent will· still be a fact of life; the latter, for example , is likely
to have only a ~ague notion of what unit costs of operatio n are.

Only when

the operatio n is a going concern and a success will the bargain ing power tilt
in favor of the host country.

In retrosp ect, early concess ions will appear

as excessiv ely generou s, if not to the g-overnment which negotia ted them, then
to the oppositi on eager to find an issue tying its politic al enemies to the
seldom popular TNCs.

It is in the nature of things that TNCs will press

their early advantag e, while the host country will press their advantag e
later on.

It is not obvious that there is much to be gained either by TNC

restrain t early in the process , nor for LDC governm ent restrain t later on,
from their respecti ve viewpoi nt.
Lamenta tions and exhorta tions are unlikely to change the dynamic s
of this cycle, which_ is based on a sharp break from a situatio n of great
uncerta inty, asymme tries and little TNC coJIDI1itment, to a situatio n of much
more informa tion, symmetry as well as large TNC investm ents in situ.
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Recognition that conditions underlying most _agreements are likely to change,
suggests the desirability of institutionalizing contract changes, as argued
by Sfnith and Wells.

This could be done by including in the contract clauses

calling for automatic, non-negotiable adjustment of certain terms (such as
progressive reduction of concession area, or phase-in of host country owner
ship), or by including clauses providing for the future renegotiation of
selected terms.

This mechanism could work better than arbitration provisions,

which have a dubious record regarding either equity or effectiveness, and
which in many parts of the third world are regarded as unacceptable impositions
on national sovereignty, unless they involve local courts and local law.
The notion of contracts as a kind of framework for an ongoing
relationship is unlikely to avoid many disputes, but could generate, as put
by Smith and Wells, brief periods of harmony between points of negotiations

which may be well worth striving for.

Anything more ambitious in this area

must await the evolution of firmer and more equitable bases for true inter
national law, to be distinguished from.what in the past was unilaterally
determined under that rubric by hegemonic powers.
There is a growing literature on the tactics of bargaining over new
and old contracts, which include advice on who should be present in the
bargaining room, whose secretaries should type drafts, etc.

Much of this

literat"ill'e draws on that on collective bargaining between trade unions
and their employers.

Rather than go into it, it may be best to focus on key

economic issues over which the bargaining struggle takes place.
remark before going into those issues:

One last

both the literature and the practice

of bargaining point out the uses of "wild men" to extract concessions from
the other side.

Often best results cm1 be achieved for the side with "wild
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men" if they are not particularly well informed and have unrealistic
expectations about the value of what they have to offer.

20

This, of course,

does not help in the search for a quiet life and smooth international
relations.

Perhaps less troublesome for a peaceful international polity is

the increasing willingness and ability of WCs to ex~hange information among
themselves regarding contracts with TNCs.
Taxes
For many direct foreign investments, taxes represent the major
In the area of exhaustible natural resources,

benefit for host countries.

which typically generate modest employment and linkages, taxes can be the
only significant benefit.

"Taxes" will be defined broadly in this section,

to cover for example the tax-equivalent value of output-sharing arrangements.
The object of taxation policy, viewed from the side of the host
government, should be simple:

it is to capture all of the Hotelliug and

HicarcUm1 rents, while letting the investor· Jiiake the rate of rctu:rn necessur;y
to induce him to come in.

Under competitive conditions in a world of

certainty, such a policy would be easy to implement.

Mining rights could be

auctioned off, or excess profit taxes could cream off rents, or other
schemes could achieve the desired objective.

The prevalence of large, unique

projects in mining suggests that case-by-case taxation which sq11 ~ezes ail rents
for the host government would be an administrative ly feasible possibility.
But uncertainty and conditions far from competitive complicate matters.

On

the one·hand, besides Hotelling and Ricardian rents, there might be oligopoly
excess profits to share.

But uncertainty makes rents and profits difficult to

predict, and raises bankruptcy fears for the investors.

Accounting problems

also arise, exacerbated by the lack of open competitive markets yielding

)
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arms-length quotations against which intra-company pricing can be checked.
The pricing of the services provided by the social overhead capital of the
host country can also raise accounting headaches.
Host countries with weak administrative machineries and eager to
obtain tax revenues with some degree of certainty have historically relied
on royalties levied as so many dollars (or whatever) per metric ton of
mineral extracted or exported.

Any beginning student of price theory could

show why this crude output or export tax is inefficient, but its simplicity
and ease of administration are appealing.

Output will fluctuate less than

profits, so the goverDII_1ent will also thrust a greater share of risks onto
the investor with this tax.
The next step in taxation is likely to be the introduction of some
sort of profit tax, either written especially for.mines, or as part of a
general profits tax in the host country.
hy excE!SS

It may or may not be accompanied

prof:1. t taxes, desj_gned to :1-licre.'lse tlie r-;ov,=.·,nment cut at times

of bonanza.

It will be difficult to firie-tune such taxes so that all rents

plus excess profits, no more and no less, are siphoned off by the host
government.

Unit costs will be uncertain to the TNC, particularly at the

start of operations in a new mine, while the supply price of international
.capital for that specific industry will be only fuzzily known to the host
govc.rn.,112nts.

Both TNC ancl host government will slnre many doubts about the

future of world markets.

The problems surrounding intra-company pricing will

create constant friction between the parties.· At times the taxes will appear
as too high, and will be charged with repelling foreign investors; at other
times companies will be seen as making a killing, which perhaps they share
with foreii::;n goverrnnents and customers.

At neither time publicly available
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data are likely to settle the issue (many years later perhaps they will,
but only some scholars will care then).
These difficultie s with profit and rent taxation have led to new
arrangemen ts, su.ch as those pioneered outside the Socialist countries by
Indonesia and Peru in oil, involving service contracts which share output
instead of profits.

In the Peruvian case, the aim of the state corporation ,

PETROPERU, was to emphasize Peruvian sovereignty over the resources while
seeking simplicity.
head.

The key is a fifty-fifty split of the oil at the well

As noted by Shane _Hunt, this assures the host country that in no case

the implicit profit tax will fall below 50 percent, but it also implies that
the tax rate can be much lower if oil prices rise significant ly, or the
companies which signed the contracts (Occidental in this case) hit spectacular
deposits.

But the risk is shifted to foreigners, with PETROPERU committing

itself to no capital outlay, while pushing Occidental to develop rapidly the
assigned ar8a.

Sha:ne Hunt cone1u.des that:

11 0utput sliaring contraets probably

obtain foreign capital and technology in as antiseptic manner as possible.
1122
Their only danger is that they shift the risk all too well.

A host country without pressing fiscal needs, confident of its
administrat ive machinery and its ability to control phony intra-compa ny
1123 Assuming a
pricing may try what has been labelled a "Resource Rent Tax.

supply price of capital for that activity, the value of the cash flow each
year could be calculated for the project, accumulatin g negative balances
(likely to occur dui~ing the early years) at a rate equal to the assumed
capital supply price.

Positive values would then be taxed at one or

various escalating rates.

To keep the TNC interested in minimizing costs,

those rates would never rea.ch 100 percent.

Advocates of this tax arg·1e

J6
that by reducing the risk of loss to the investors, who effectively will
enjoy a "tax holiday" whose duration will be inversely related to the
actual profitability of the project, it will allow host governments to
raise expected tax yields without discouraging capital inflows.
A somewhat related tax has been put into practice in Papua-New
Guinea, for a project involving the Bougainville Copper Limited, which is
subjected to a JJ.3 percent company tax on earnings up to a 15 percent return
on agreed capital, to which a marginal tax rate of 70 percent on additional
earnings is added.

However, the calculations are done on a year-to-year basis,

with no provision for carrying forward any shortfall of profits below the 15
percent return on agreed capital, to count against possible future excess
profits, as in the Resource Rent Tax proposai. 24
• During 1974 Jamaica imposed additional taxes on its bauxite industry,
this time on output, but expressed in value terms. 25

As an arms-length price

for bauxite is not available, the tax was geared to the price of aluminum
ingot.

A minimum level of production, somewhat over 90 per~ent of capacity,

is also assumed for tax purposes.

If production falls below the stipulated

level, the scheme is in fact a lump sum tax.

With this action, Jamaica has

certainly increased its share of the pure rents generated by its bauxite
industry, which for Caribbean producers include a significant amount generated
by their proximity to the major market.

It is more debatable wh8ther it has

captured 100 percent of those rents, and whether it has eaten into the
oligopolistic super-profits of the far from competitive aluminum producers.
It would take remarkable economics to argue that consumers of aluminum have
been so far the major losers from the Jamaican actions.
Auctioning exploitation rights was mentioned earlier as a
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theoretical device to assure host countries of all rents from mineral deposits.
Why is this not done more often?

Simply because when one goes to look at a

specific project the potential number of interested parties narrows down
sharply.

This, in turn, is caused by lack of complete information regarding

what is being auctioned off, by both government and companies.

Firms are

un~ikely to explore without assurance that they will be able to exploit
successful discoveries , so in practice some exploitatio n rights must be given
to firms which_ will engage in prospecting .

In other cases, complement aries

in production act to further narrow down available candidates.

Shane Hunt

relates how the Peruvian government sought potential entrants from Europe,
Japan and the U.S.S.R. into the development of its Cuajone deposit.

"Few

companies possess familiarity with the technology of open-pit copper mining.
Fewer still have access to the enormous amount of capital required.

Moreover,

the potential difficultie s of sharing transport, refinery, and export
facilities with Southern Peru in its adjacent Toquepala deposit essentially
ruled out the entry of a new company.
was Southern Peru or nothing. 1126

The choice available became clear:

it

In the case of oil, contemporar y circum

stances make the auctioning option more feasible.

A relatively wide diffusion

of oil drilling technology plus relatively easy marketabil ity for oil con
tribute to this result.
Perhaps the simplest way for a host government to make sure that it is
capturing all rents from mineral exploitatio n is to run the mines itself.
What needs explaining is why many radical third world countries have stopped
short of this solution to the taxation problem.

One answer is that the

generation of rents cannot be taken for granted, i.e., the efficient operation
of mines may require skills not yet available in host countries.

In some
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cases, secretaries as well as engineers may be in short supply.

To this

one should add that the alternative of natlonalization plus selective
hiring in world markets by the LDC government of the inputs missing locally
has advanced slowly partly due to the weaknesses in world markets for some of
those inputs, particularly technological ones, and partly due to the
difficulty of combining efficiently those disparate inputs.

But as LDC

national companies gain experience, and broaden the demand for specialized
services, this situation is likely to change, making the nationalization
solution increasingly attractive.
In some cases, LDC reluctance to nationalize may come not from lack
of technological self-confidence, but from a desire to maintain the
oligopolistic structures built up by TNCs in the past, and to increasingly
share in oligopolistic super-profits.

If one assumes that in the past parent

governments directly shared in those super-profits only by taxing the meagre
declared

11

downstrerun 11 earnings of their TNCs, the taxation problem now becomes

more complicated, as emphasized by C. Fred Bergsten.

The zero-sum-game

features of the situation point to sharp conflict, or

11

investment wars,"

unless clear international rules are agreed upon.
National Control, Training and Linkages
Less tangible but no less important than the struggle for a
higher share of mining rents and profits is the LDC search for greater
national control over their mining industries, which often generate high
percentages of their Gross National Products and even higher shares of
foreign exchange earnings.

The rationale for such a desire is well known;

and is increasingly accepted.

Here it will be sufficient to stress the
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point that even total nationa lization will not insure nationa l control
(defined in some corrnnonsensical fashion ) over the mining activity unless
formal ownersh ip is accompanied by detailed knowledge of its operatio n both
at the product ion and the marketin g ends.

Knowled geable "hired hands" can

get away with much without even ensuring efficien cy if the ovmers lack
mastery of technic al and ec?nomic details.

This applies, a fortior i,

in joint ventures where nationa ls sit on the board of director s with foreign ers.
At the very least special technic al committ ees staffed by experts indepen dent
of the foreign partner should be used under those circums tances to advise
nationa l members of the board of directo rs.
It may also be noted that in spite of some torrid first world
rhetoric , in actual practice compens ation has been paid in the majorit y of
nationa lization s, usually based on book value, which has increas ingly been
accepted as the standard for settlem ents.

Often governm ents have paid

foreign investo rs for the shares purchase d out of future dividend s.

Pro

grammed changes in ownersh ip became fashion able in the early 197Os, althoug h
as noted by Smith and Wells, 27 the ccncept appeare d in much earlier agr,eements, in the form of host country options to buy shares at a later date.
These authors specula te that future arrangem ents may build in put-opt ions
by foreign investo rs if and when domestic ownersh ip reaches a certain
percenta ge of equity.
The training effects of gradual nationa lization s can be strength ened
by provisio ns calling on the partner TNC to set up minimum employment quotas
for nationa ls, in differen t employment categor ies, as well as by fellows hips
for the study abroad of young people of the host country .

One can conject ure

that there is some tax payment which would be equival ent to the addi tj -:mal
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burdens placed on the TNC by such training requirements.

Simplicity would

call for consolidating bargaining over taxes alone, but both host countries
and TNC seem to prefer to spread their interaction over a broader area,
including the enlisting of TNCs to help LDC efforts to diversify into
industries related to their natural resources.
Besides the aspiration of control over mineral resources, LDCs
where the mines are located have· for many years been eager to expan~ some
backward and forward linkages of those operations with their national
economies.

Linkages have been limited partly ·for purely economic and

technical reasons:

inputs required by the mines are frequently sophisticated

manufactured goods, while the further processing arid refining of ores may be
best located near large customers.

But distortions in the world economy have

also deprived LDCs of a larger share of manufacturing activities servicing
mines or processing their output.

Perhaps the easiest one to recognize is

tha~ involving escalating tariffs in industrialized countries, which yield
substantial effective protection to their processing activities.

More

subtle distortions would include the packaged sale of inputs by branches of
the same TNC exploiting the mine, or by related foreign firms.

Here one ca.~

find "customer relationships" which may make sense from the viewpoint of the
TNC, but not necessarily from that of the host country.

Locating processing

plants away from the LDC providing the raw material may also be part of TNC
strategy to reduce risks and increase its relative bargaining power.

Placing

the refinery in such an LDC could mean giving up the flexibility the TNC
obtains by having more than one source of supply for its downstream operations.
Costs to LDCs of a breakdown of its links to TNCs are raised:

to this day

Cuban efforts to expand nickel production qre hampered by inaccessibility to
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the Port Nickel refinery, originally built in Louisiana by the Freeport
Sulphur Company to process the difficult Cuban lateritic nickel-bearing ores. 28
Maximizing all linkages from mining operations remains, however, a
dubious economic strategy for LDCs.

In some cases, LDC resources may best

be employed in activities totally unrelated to the mines.

Indeed, traditional

attacks on enclaves within LDCs have been muted by recognition that some
undesirable spillovers from activities run in cooperation with foreign
capital can be minimized precisely by enclaves.

Demonstration effects in

luxury consumption,in wage claims,and in politics may best be held in check
when the mining operation is tucked away in some remote part of the LDC, and
its interaction with the national economy only goes through a few well
controlled channels.

Remoteness from population centers is a clear advantage

when the mines and refineries pollute or disfigure their surroundings.
Both world efficiency and equity could gain by greater LDC processing
and_ marketing of minerals, and by their providing a greater share of the inputs
to the mines.

Forward and backward integration may under some circumstances

be a necessary :i.ngredient in LDC efforts to expand their bargaining power in
world markets .

.An increasing share of LDC minerals and fuels is likely to be

marketed directly by LDC organizations, cutting out the foreign middleman.
But one worries that LDC enthusiasm for'pushing some of these activities could
generate inefficiencies.

Processing can be very capital-intensive, as well

as skill-intensive, and may not be the best investment LDCs can make.

An

oil exporting country, in other words, may do better than investing in a
fancy petrochemical comple,:.

"
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Neglected Issues and Some Conclusions
A listing of issues neglected in this paper may be useful.

The

focus on LDCs kept us from inquiring about mineral policies of small
industrialized countries, such as Australia, Canada, Ireland and Norway, as
well as those of socialist countries.

Their experiences in dealing with

TNCs, the Soviet ventures in Siberia, e~c., may yield insights not forth
coming from an exclusive focus on LDCs. 29

The topic of cooperation between

LDCs and socialist countries in mineral technology is also intriguing.

While

socialist countries have called on TNCs for technological inputs in some
areas, they may nevertheless be alternative sources of technology in others.
The U.S.S.R. may not be able to help Cuba much in the development of
lateritic nickel-bearing ores, but its contribution may be more important
in the exploitation of the Masqalah phosphate ·deposits in Morocco.

Intra-LDC

cooperation may also grow, as national enterprises gain in experience.

It

remains to be seen whether the relations between, say BRASPETRO and Iraq,
will be more harmonious than those between. Iraq and older TNCs.
The paper analyzed LDC pressure for capturing greater shares of
mineral rents and profits, but it has said nothing as to how those gains
will be allocated within each LDC.
to imagine, but likely.

A variety of outcomes is not only easy

One could speculate about the link between bargain

ing zeal and the manner of distributing internally the fruits of bargaining.
Several LDCs groups could be isolated:

the ruling group, the mine workers,

the state bureaucracy, the poorest fifty percent of the population.

How

increasing national control over rntural resom'ccs touches each of them
will diff(~r between Alee:ri2. and Sa.udi 1'...rabia, · between Iran and Cuba.
Many LDCs are pcorly endowed with fuel and mineral resources.

.,
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Tests cf strength among industrialized countries, mineral-rich LDCs and
TNCs will have important repercussions to those poorly endowed LDCs, a
matt·er which has received little analytical (in contrast with propagandistic )
attention.
The consequences of TNCs and minerals for the distribution of
economic and political power within developed countries is another neglected
topic.

The growing debate within the United States regarding the desirability

of breaking up oil TNCs indicates the importance of the issue.

Industrialized

country policies regarding strategic stockpiles of fuels and minerals, and how
such stockpiles have influenced markets, have not been analyzed.
Mining-the "comrnonsn of mankind, such as -the sea bottoms and
Antarctica, has been mentioned as a clear case where international.m arkets, as
p1~esently arranged, would yield ineffici.e:rrt resnl.ts, also unlikely to be
equitable.

How to remedy the la.ck of clear property titles, the role of TN Cs

and how to distribute the growing scarcity rents gc:nerated by the ncommoris;'
has been left for others to explore.

One may

notice, however, tha·s potential

remedies include taxes which can improve efficiency in resource exploitation
while generatj_ng resources which could be cham1elled to reduce poverty.

This

is one of those rare situations where both efficiency and equity could be
served by taxes.
The controversy over the limits to long term growth which ff:ay arise
from finite stocks of naturr1.l resources lms been ignored in this paper.

It

is well known that ~ither optimistic or pes8imistic models can be built by

sul.istitu"Lton or population g1'v:.'Lll.
on on0 '.s ~m:i.maJ_ .r,p.ir-i ts. JO

Th,: cllo:i.cc or :1::,su1r..pt:i..ons depends nmch
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The paper has laid great stress on the technical and political
difficulties hampering the smooth functioning of international trade and
investment in minerals.

The skeptical reader may suggest that many of the

points made to support this view apply equally well to all international
markets.

It may in fact be difficult to demonstrate statistically that

international markets for oil, uranium and gold have historically been less
perfect than those for coffee and machine tools.

Peering into the future,

one can at least argue that policy makers are likely to continue perceiving
international markets for most exhaustible natural resources as more imperfect
than others.

The United States proposal for an International Resources Bank,

for example, stresses that world investment is being inefficiently allocated,
with too little going to exploit LDC mineral deposits, due to fears of non
commerci~l risks.

LDCs engaged in mineral production, on the other hand,

are hardly satisfied with world markets as they are.

Grumbling and

agi~ation of this sort on both sides does not seem as great for other markets.
Movement toward more efficient and equitable international markets
in this area is unlikely to be possible in isolation from movements in that
direction in other international markets.

Reasonably efficient world

markets for technology and capital, for example, could do much to improve
markets for exhaustible natural resources.
11

It is a virtue of demands for a

New International Economic Order" that they emphasize the need to look at

world markets in their totality, something not done since the days of the
debate over the International Trade Organization.
Elsewhere, I have argued the case for international economic
relat:ionG which are standoffish, decoraposible and reversible, for a world
of nation states which desire to maintain their autonomy and yet benefit

.,
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from the international division of labor.

31

Reasonably open and competitive

markets working under clear and internationally agreed rules of the game
are still the best bet for achieving movement toward such goals.

Those

markets have not existed in the past for minerals, and are unlikely to
emerge spontaneously, or persist when they do.

It was seen earlier that

high doses of "customer relationships" a:i:-e likely to characterize markets in
minerals, making trade and investment in minerals less standoffish and
reversible than in cotton or steel.

But one could imagine international

rules promoting movement in the desired·direction, particularly regarding
closer vigilance of TNCs engaged in restraint of trade practices, establishing
Keynes--ITO commodity stabilization agreements in selected areas, and
encouraging long term arm's length contracts of the type negotiated between
AustraliH and Japan.

With a minimum of trust between the parties, such

contracts can provide a viable alternative to vertical integration and yield
both relative security of supply and sales.

Fuels and minerals are fairly

homogenous and unchanging commodities not plagued by product differentiation,
repair needs, etc., which make clear contracts problematical for many manu
factured goods, such as machinery.
Changes in the structure of world trade and investment in non
renewable resources will remain traumatic and complicated.

Those whose

comfortable positions are threatened by those changes, particularly TNCs,
will no doubt warn about the danger of killing the goose that lays the
golden ~ggs.

This goose has cried wolf many times before, yet is alive and

robust, th:::1.nl~s partl;y to its rer:iar]mble ada.p ti ve capacity.

Adapt2.tion nill

f~lso be necessary for those who prefer to buy their fuels and minerals just
from TNGs which speak their language.

But the cultural adJustments r,:quired
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to be comfort able relying directly on African s, Asians and Latin America ns
for one's fuels and mineral s should not be so difficu lt.
will not be many cheap alternat ives to it in the future.

After all, there
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